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Broadcasting from the Sundance Film Festival, we are assimilated by 3 guest who privately battled with DuPont and are featured in the new documentary called “The Devil We Know,” that looks at how former DuPont employees, residents and lawyers took on the chemical hulk to display the risk of the chemical C8, found in Teflon and large domicile products—from stain- and water-resistant attire to x-ray popcorn bags to dental floss. The chemical has now been associated to 6 diseases, including testicular and kidney cancers. We pronounce with Bucky Bailey, whose mom worked in the Teflon multiplication of a DuPont plant in West Virginia while she was profound with him, and who was innate with only one nostril and a misshapen eye and has undergone some-more than 30 surgeries to fix the birth defects; Joe Kiger, lead plaintiff in a category movement lawsuit against DuPont, and a school teacher in Parkersburg, West Virginia, who suffered from liver disease; and Rob Bilott, the profession that brought DuPont to court.
This is a rush transcript. Copy may not be in its final form.
AMY GOODMAN: We are broadcasting from the Sundance Film Festival in Park City, Utah. Nearly 70 years ago, the chemical hulk DuPont introduced a product that would renovate how people around the universe cook: nonstick Teflon pans.
HOME COOK: Oh! Well, good thing it’s Teflon.
NARRATOR: Even burned food won’t hang to Teflon, so it’s always easy to clean. Cookware never needs scouring, if it has DuPont Teflon.
AMY GOODMAN: The chemicals in the product, C8, went on to be used in large domicile products, from stain- and water-resistant attire to x-ray popcorn bags to dental floss. But DuPont had a secret it never told the American open or many of its own workers: C8 is rarely toxic. But that didn’t stop them from discharging C8 into the waterways around its prolongation plant in Parkersburg, West Virginia. It’s now been associated to 6 diseases, including testicular and kidney cancers. The chemical has been used so widely, it’s now in the bloodstream of 99 percent of Americans, even baby babies. And the chemical is bioresistant, definition it does not mangle down.
The onslaught to learn the law about C8 and hold DuPont accountable is the theme of a overwhelming new documentary that premiered here at Sundance. It’s called The Devil We Know. The film is formed in Parkersburg, West Virginia.
JOE KIGER: Everybody in this area, in one way or another, is connected to DuPont. You go traffic with somebody’s livelihood, which is their job, which is their insurance and their protection, and you go messing with that, you’re going to have problems.
AMY GOODMAN: The documentary The Devil We Know looks at how former DuPont employees, residents and lawyers took on DuPont.
MIKE PAPANTONIO: They wanted to trust that it was just people in the bureau that were influenced by all this. But, unfortunately, they had transparent information that the levels of bearing for people outward the bureau were actually aloft than the people who worked in the factory. But when they determined, should we tell people outward the factory, they didn’t. They kept it a secret. Their own scientists, again and again—their own lawyers, in fact—told them, “You know, we really should—we should tell people about this, given they’re celebration it in their water.”
SHARON LERNER: DuPont became wakeful that the chemical had seeped over its plant, and they wanted to figure out how distant it had gotten. So a group went out with some jugs, plastic jars, and went to ubiquitous stores and went miles downriver to collect samples. They didn’t contend given they were collecting samples or that they were from the company, but, in contrast these samples, found that, in fact, the chemical had left utterly distant from the plant.
AMY GOODMAN: Today we’re assimilated by 3 guest who privately battled with DuPont and are featured in the film The Devil We Know. Bucky Bailey’s mom worked in the Teflon multiplication of a DuPont plant in West Virginia while she was pregnant. Bucky was innate with one nostril and a misshapen eye. He has undergone some-more than 30 surgeries to fix the birth defects. Joe Kiger was lead plaintiff in a category movement lawsuit against DuPont. He was a school teacher in Parkersburg, West Virginia, who suffered from liver disease. And Rob Bilott is with us, the profession that brought DuPont to court. In 2016, The New York Times Magazine ran a profile of him headlined “The Lawyer Who Became DuPont’s Worst Nightmare.” In 2017, he was awarded the Right Livelihood Award. Bucky Bailey, Joe Kiger and Rob Bilott are joining us here at Park City TV in Park City, Utah.
Welcome, all, to Democracy Now! Joe, I’d like to start with you. Why don’t you tell us your story, when you start to comprehend something was wrong in your town?
JOE KIGER: Well, we was sitting out in my courtyard, and the wife was watering the flowers and so on. The mail went. She went out and got the mail, non-stop it up, and there was a check there from the Lubeck Public Services District, which reserve the water. And she told me, she said, “Honey,” she said, “there’s a minute here from Lubeck Public Service.” we said, “Well, let me see it.” She handed it to me. we review it. It was a form letter. And in that letter, it settled the fact that there was a chemical in the water, and it was called C8, but according to DuPont standards, it wasn’t harmful. So, we didn’t consider anything about it, put it down.
But within the next month or so, we started observant some-more things: dogs with tumors, people with tumors, people getting ill, getting sick and everything. But the one that really got me was the little girl that had black teeth. Her teeth started branch black.
AMY GOODMAN: Totally black.
JOE KIGER: Yeah, they started at the top, and then they started to—and they couldn’t figure out what was going on. And we told the wife, we said, “You know, we got a minute from DuPont, something about the water, some chemical.” we said, “I just got a tummy feeling. we wish to demeanour at that.” So, the some-more we review it and went over it and over it, the some-more red flags started popping up. we said, “Yeah, something’s not right here.”
So, we started pursuit the inner agencies. First of all, we called DuPont, talked to a lady down there. She didn’t really give me any answers, so we started pursuit the Department of Natural Resources. we thought, “Well, they’ll certainly be…” They blew me off. The Health Department was almost rude. And so, anyway, we called several agencies, to make a prolonged story short, couldn’t get any answer. And we finally, you know—I just—oh, and we called Gerald Kennedy, the conduct toxicologist from DuPont. He and we talked for substantially 45 mins to an hour, hung the phone up. And the wife said, “Well, what did you find out?” we said, “I was just fed the biggest line of BS I’ve ever been fed.”
So, that, in turn, got me to call the national EPA. we didn’t know what else to do. I’d been at this for about 9 months. And called up there and got a hold of a gentleman. He sent me some papers. He told me, he said, “You review them over.” He said, “You may wish to hit a lawyer.” And that’s when we got a hold of Mr. Bilott. We put things together, and it started from there.
AMY GOODMAN: And, Bucky Bailey, tell us your story. Well, start with your mom.
BUCKY BAILEY: So, my mom worked directly with the C8 chemical, directly on the line of production. And—
AMY GOODMAN: Of Teflon, in particular, the DuPont plant.
BUCKY BAILEY: Yes, ma’am. And she was private when she was profound with me, from the line, stating reserve reasons. And after that, she had no inclinations or had no reports from the alloy that we was going to have deformities, and was taken aback by that and began to question, as things began to come together with opposite things. And—
AMY GOODMAN: Can you tell me, when you were born, what were the hurdles you faced?
BUCKY BAILEY: Many. we wasn’t given a day to live. Doctors came in and told my parents, brutally, “Don’t get your hopes up. He may not make it by the night.”
AMY GOODMAN: What was wrong?
BUCKY BAILEY: I wasn’t respirating properly. My mom was devastated. She was having to lay me up just so we could breathe. The nurses, no one wanted to hold me.
AMY GOODMAN: Can you report your nose and your eye when you were born?
BUCKY BAILEY: Yes. So we was innate with one nostril. Completely, we have a serrated eyelid and a keyhole pupil.
AMY GOODMAN: Which means, a keyhole pupil?
BUCKY BAILEY: My student is off to the right. And we have light source and some design visibility, but we can't review out of it.
AMY GOODMAN: At the time, did she immediately couple it to her work at DuPont?
BUCKY BAILEY: At the time, she was bewildered. She did accept a phone call, that gave her suspicion, wondering about my status, not about how she was or anything moving forward, which, at the time, held her off ensure completely, given DuPont was such a good company. It was the status quo to be a partial of DuPont.
AMY GOODMAN: Would you contend it’s satisfactory to contend it was a company town?
BUCKY BAILEY: Absolutely. Unequivocally.
AMY GOODMAN: So, we wish to go to a video that the West Virginia cattle rancher Wilbur Tennant shot on his skill in the 1990s, after he sole partial of his land to DuPont for what the company had positive him would be a non-hazardous landfill. This is Tennant filming a stream.
WILBUR TENNANT: That water shouldn’t demeanour like that. There’s something a little wrong with this water. This things comes on down this stream of water. What outcome will this anti-sudsing solution have on the livestock? I’ve taken two passed deer and two passed cattle off of this sputter right here. And they tell me the deer died with hemorrhing disease. Well, he was hemorrhing illness all right. The blood run out of their nose and out of their mouth.
But they’ve never—DNR has never checked into it. They need—the EPA of the state of West Virginia, they’re trying to cover this things up. But it’s not going to be covered up, given I’m going to bring it out in the open for people to see.
AMY GOODMAN: So, that’s video shot by the rancher Wilbur Tennant on his skill in Parkersburg, West Virginia, after he sole partial of the land to the—DuPont for a landfill. A year later, he filmed what happened to his cows.
WILBUR TENNANT: You can see she’s hemorrhaged out the nose. You call this hemorrhing illness or whatever you wish to call it, but this cow died with intensely high fever. You see the blemish in the hair here on her neck. This is 153 of these animals that I’ve lost on this farm. And the state veterinarian, Doc Thomas, he won’t come up here, do anything about it. And every veterinarian that I’ve called in Parkersburg, they will not return my phone calls, or they don’t wish to get involved.
So, given they don’t wish to get involved, I’ll have to disintegrate this thing myself. And I’m going to save the tools of it, and I’m going to start at this conduct of it. One of the things I’ve beheld right off is the blemish of these jaw teeth. This is on the top. And here’s his tongue. we don’t know what those little red spots are in there on the bottom partial of that thing’s tongue. we don’t know. This is very surprising here. Looks like divert coming up on that beef tissues. And we never saw zero like this in my life.
AMY GOODMAN: Again, that’s video shot by the rancher Wilbur Tennant on his skill in Parkersburg, West Virginia, after he sole partial of his land to DuPont for what he guess was going to be a non-hazardous landfill. And, Rob Bilott, that brings you into the picture. How did you get involved?
ROB BILOTT: Well, we got a call from Mr. Tennant. It was back in 1998, just out of the blue, and didn’t commend the voice on the other end. And then he mentioned that my grandmother, who actually had grown up in that area, my mom’s—
AMY GOODMAN: Your grandmother.
ROB BILOTT: Yes, my mom’s family was from Parkersburg. Mr. Tennant was having difficulty getting any warn in city to speak to him, because, as you indicated, this was a company town. A lot of people work for the company, work for DuPont. So, he had to strech outward of the inner area to find somebody who would speak to him. And he called me and was explaining that he was having all these troubles with his cows. And could he come to the offices and bring videotapes and photographs and show us what he was seeing? So, when we listened that this was coming by my grandmother, we said, “Sure, come on up and bring your materials.” So he came to the offices.
AMY GOODMAN: Now, just to be clear, they listened you were some kind of environmental lawyer.
ROB BILOTT: Correct.
AMY GOODMAN: But you were actually representing corporations.
ROB BILOTT: Correct.
AMY GOODMAN: And you had worked with DuPont lawyers.
ROB BILOTT: Right, right. Our law organisation had typically finished a lot of work for big chemical companies. And, in fact, we had spent the before eight years of my career operative for big chemical companies, doing environmental law, assisting with needing issues. And this seemed like something we could help him with, given what was happening was these cows were celebration white foaming water that was being liberated from a landfill. So, we insincere we could lift the permits, we could find out what was happening. So he brought his videotapes and photographs up to us. We took a demeanour at it, and we satisfied something really bad was happening here. You could see the white foaming water coming out of a liberate siren noted “DuPont Company.” So, we concluded to take that case on, back in 1999.
And at that point, we started looking by the—everything that was regulated and listed and available in the landfill, and really couldn’t figure out what was causing this problem. It was about a year later, after digging by lots and lots of documents, that we found a request that mentioned something called PFOA. And it was something we had never listened of. So we went to the customary environmental libraries to try to investigate what this chemical was, and we really couldn’t find any information about it. And it was at that indicate we started asking the DuPont Company for information about this PFOA chemical, given it was something they indicated had been put it in that landfill.
So, that began the fight. We got a lot of pushback from the company about giving us this information. And after a lot of battling back and forth, we started getting these inner papers from DuPont. And then we started putting the story together about what the company had famous about this chemical, how widely it had been used for over 50 years, that 7,000 tons of it had been put into the landfill, that was then discharging into Mr. Tennant’s creek. And, many disturbingly, we schooled that not only had the chemical been likely of in this landfill, it was being pumped into the Ohio River, it was going up the stacks for decades from the plant. And what we saw was that DuPont had famous given the early 1980s this was in the celebration water of the whole village surrounding the plant.
We eventually were means to settle the farmer’s case. But at that indicate we knew the whole village was celebration this and had not been told. So, we put a minute together in Mar of 2001, putting a lot of these inner papers together, and sent it to the United States EPA to warning them, and to the state of West Virginia: There is a chemical in the water that people are drinking, and it’s even above standards that even yet the sovereign agencies hadn’t regulated, DuPont scientists had pronounced you shouldn’t have it above one partial per billion in the water. And it was way above that, in the inner water. So we alerted the agencies in 2001, “Please, come in and do something. Start controlling this.”
And the village started to learn about it. That’s how Joe schooled about it. And what we saw in these papers were the studies that DuPont was doing internally, including looking at pregnancy outcome, including with Bucky’s mother, and the results of the blood contrast and birth defects study that DuPont had done, with Bucky, in the early 1980s.
AMY GOODMAN: So, we mean, this is amazing, Bucky. They are following you, but you don’t comprehend that, and your mom doesn’t comprehend this. They are not giving you information. They’re just holding information but not giving it to the public.
BUCKY BAILEY: Correct. They denied it to my mom, face to face, over the phone, many times. There was zero wrong. They weren’t monitoring. It was just customary use for them.
AMY GOODMAN: We’re going to go to a break, and then we’re going to come back to hear what the DuPont lawyers were saying, how they helped to really lead a cover that would finish up polluting the bodies of 99 percent, not only of the people of Parkersburg, but of the United States. Does Gore-Tex ring a bell? Teflon? We’re going to find out the list of products that use C8, and what eventually happened to C8 and chemicals that are being used now to reinstate it. This is Democracy Now! The Devil We Know. Stay with us.[break]
AMY GOODMAN: “Bring Him Back Home” by Hugh Masekela, the father of South African jazz. He was singing about Nelson Mandela, who was in jail for 27 years. Hugh Masekela has died at the age of 78 in Johannesburg.
This is Democracy Now!, democracynow.org, The War and Peace Report. I’m Amy Goodman. We’re broadcasting from Park City, Utah, at the Sundance Film Festival. And last night, we saw an strange film, its universe premiere, The Devil We Know, which looks at how residents in West Virginia fought DuPont to display the dangers of a chemical called C8, that’s used to make Teflon nonstick pans and other domicile items.
Our guest now came in for this film and have been intent in a battle for decades. Bucky Bailey’s mom worked in the Teflon multiplication of the DuPont plant in West Virginia when she was pregnant. He was innate with only one nostril and a misshapen eye, has undergone, oh, at slightest 30 surgeries to fix his birth defects. He’s now in his forties. Joe Kiger was lead plaintiff in a category movement lawsuit against DuPont, school teacher in Parkersburg, West Virginia, who suffered from liver disease. And Rob Bilott is with us, the eminent profession that brought DuPont to justice and to its knees.
Again, as we continue this story, Rob Bilott, can you speak about DuPont’s in-house warn and the deposition that you took, when your client, Wilbur Tennant, the rancher who took the video of his failing cows—they saw they had a problem on their hands?
ROB BILOTT: Yeah. One of the things that we were means to expose during the lawsuit, in the find process, we were means to get a lot of the inner emails that DuPont’s lawyers were sending, including emails that one of the attorneys representing DuPont, Bernie Reilly, had written. Some of them were to his son. Some of them were to one of his friends. But they were providing insights into what the authorised warn for DuPont were meditative about what was going on with the Tennantcase and what problems it could benefaction for the company, going forward.
AMY GOODMAN: And what did he say? And you can’t abuse on the air.
ROB BILOTT: Well, there was one email in sole where, after we had alerted the company that we had finally kind of started reckoning this out and we was wakeful that PFOA was what was in the landfill and it was what the cows were celebration and it was in the open water supply, there was an email where the warn finished a anxiety to “F— him. He knows about this now, and f— him.”
AMY GOODMAN: So, he’s articulate about the cow farmer.
ROB BILOTT: Yes.
AMY GOODMAN: So, they have to—how prolonged did they keep this still for? And tell us the products that C8 is in.
ROB BILOTT: This was a chemical that the DuPont Company had started using as early as 1951. And it was being used essentially at the Parkersburg, West Virginia, plant to make products that were used in nonstick coatings like Teflon. But the chemical was also used, for many years, in making a accumulation of opposite products, such as stain-resistant carpeting, like Stainmaster carpeting. It was used in making stain-resistant, grease-proof cloaking for fast-food wrappers, x-ray popcorn bags, pizza boxes, stain-resistant and waterproof clothing, fabric protectors, shoe water repellents. It just—
AMY GOODMAN: How does Gore-Tex use C8?
ROB BILOTT: Gore-Tex, the chemical was used in making the coatings that were used in Gore-Tex materials.
AMY GOODMAN: And where does Scotchgard fit into this picture?
ROB BILOTT: The 3M Company is actually the company that started making C8, back in the late 1940s. They were selling PFOA, or C8, to DuPont for use in Teflon and associated materials. They also, though, the 3M Company, finished a very similar, very closely associated chemical called PFOS. That chemical was what was finished and used in making Scotchgard. And as some of this information started to trickle out to the U.S. EPA about the Scotchgard chemical, in 1998-1999 timeframe, the U.S. EPA was looking at PFOS, the Scotchgard chemical, seeing some of this information, and was getting very endangered about it. And at that point, the 3M Company announced that it would stop making PFOS, that was used in Scotchgard, and PFOA. Yet, at that point, the DuPont Company, who could have also motionless to stop using PFOA—DuPont finished the decision to go brazen and start making PFOA itself. And it started doing so.
AMY GOODMAN: So, 3M stops given it’s so dangerous, and DuPont just takes it over? Where did the EPA fit into this story?
ROB BILOTT: Well, as we mentioned, we first alerted—the EPA was looking at PFOS, the Scotchgard chemical, wasn’t really focusing on PFOA. And in Mar of 2001, when we sent my minute to U.S. EPA alerting them, “You need to also demeanour at this very closely associated chemical, PFOA, given it is in the celebration water here in West Virginia and Ohio, is likely in the blood of lots of people, as well,” that started triggering U.S. EPAto first start looking at this chemical.
And they started having to play what I’d impersonate as a catch-up game. You know, this is a chemical that had been in use and was being issued into the sourroundings given the 1950s, but it predated a lot of the sovereign laws that compulsory contrast and law of chemicals before they went into process. So, the EPA really hadn’t looked at this chemical. And one of the things they eventually did is, the U.S. EPA, once they started looking by all this information, they brought a lawsuit against DuPont in 2004, saying, “There was information about the toxicity and widespread decay of this chemical. You should have told us decades earlier. We could have begun controlling this decades ago.”
AMY GOODMAN: So, how did it get into the bloodstream of 99 percent of Americans?
ROB BILOTT: As we lay here today, that’s still arrange of an ongoing investigate question. But a lot of what we know now is, the chemical is issued from prolongation plants, goes up into the air from smokestacks, can get up into water droplets, into the clouds, and send over the whole planet. And it is now in the blood of not just 99 percent of Americans, but the whole globe, everybody on the planet. Polar bears, every animal on this—every animal category is being tested. But it’s coming from not only these plant emissions, it’s coming from consumer product use, as well.
AMY GOODMAN: And so, what happened? How did DuPont stop prolongation C8 and spin to a new chemical called GenX?
ROB BILOTT: It was during the march of the lawsuit, as we’re providing some-more of this information to the U.S. EPA, and the U.S. EPA is getting some-more and some-more endangered about it. They’ve brought a lawsuit. They’ve started, actually, a rapist investigation, in 2005. DuPont eventually settles the case in West Virginia. They also then settle the case that the U.S. EPA had brought against them. And one of the things they also concluded to do is they announced that they will have a 10-year phaseout of any serve prolongation or use of PFOA in the United States. That’s announced in 2006.
AMY GOODMAN: In the United States.
ROB BILOTT: Correct. It’s announced in 2006, and the phaseout finally went in—DuPont stopped using it by 2013. They had until 2015 to stop using it. But some of the prolongation presumably is now going on in China. And again, given of the way this chemical can pierce around the environment, it doesn’t really matter where it’s made, it’ll still get up and contaminate.
AMY GOODMAN: And what’s the company DuPont spun off to make GenX?
ROB BILOTT: In 20—I trust it was 2015 or right around that indicate in time, the DuPont Company spun off the multiplication that had been making Teflon-related materials. They spun it off into a new company called Chemours. And they then—
AMY GOODMAN: C-H-E-M-O-U-R-S.
ROB BILOTT: Yes, the Chemours Company. And the Chemours Company took over a lot of these plants, including the Parkersburg plant, that had been making these fluoro products. And then they also started changeable to use of a new element to replace PFOA. As this phaseout was occurring, they shifted over to a new material, which they are referring to now as GenX.
AMY GOODMAN: You have turn a major force in plaintiff law, but you started as the man who represented chemical companies. How did you shift, personally, when you started to comprehend what was happening, when your colleagues—I mean, DuPont lawyers—you’re now seeing, as you bring in depositions, fibbing to you? And where—when it comes to, you said, rapist investigation, are there rapist investigations of the CEO, for example, of DuPont?
ROB BILOTT: You know, we got to take the deposition of the CEO of DuPont. That was back in 2003-2004 timeframe. And as indicated, the U.S. Department of Justice had started a rapist review in 2005. After the phaseout was announced in 2006, the rapist review was dropped, after that. And I’m not wakeful of any rapist review that’s going on. we do know that one of the plants that was using this element and is now using GenX, that’s now owned by Chemours, in Dordrecht, Netherlands—there is an review going on in the Netherlands of all these activities.
AMY GOODMAN: Now, DuPont and Chemours Company have concluded to pay—this is as of last February—$671 million in cash to settle thousands of lawsuits involving a trickle of this poisonous chemical used to make Teflon. And that was the C8. That was the—
ROB BILOTT: Correct.
AMY GOODMAN: So, does this embody the two of you, Bucky Bailey? Does this embody you, Joe Kiger? Why?
JOE KIGER: I—
AMY GOODMAN: Joe?
JOE KIGER: All due respect, this man has finished a heck of a job, the whole whole profession firms and all that. we just was not at the point, at this time, prepared to sign off on it. we had my own philosophy and everything. we didn’t wish to take a possibility on, if we sealed off, not being means to, you know, investigate and do some-more work. we feel there’s some-more out there to do against DuPont. So, and we felt, by signing off, we would, you know, presumably be gagged, and we didn’t wish that.
AMY GOODMAN: Bucky?
BUCKY BAILEY: I was actually forsaken from the category movement suit. we now don’t have a fit filed against them, given nothing of the associated diseases from the scholarship row we have. And at this point, they weren’t peaceful to contend that the deformities are a cause.
AMY GOODMAN: Now, you speak about the scholarship panel. Rob Bilott, explain what that is.
ROB BILOTT: At the time we reached a allotment with DuPont, in 2004, for the category movement lawsuit that Joe and we had brought, one of the things that we wanted to do was actually do a consummate human health study. Most of what had been finished up to that indicate had been finished with adult—primarily adult, healthy, male worker populations. And there typically weren’t big adequate race sizes in these studies to draw what the companies would impute to as statistically significantly current results. You indispensable outrageous numbers in sequence to find singular diseases, quite cancers or birth forsake outcomes.
So, what we sat down and negotiated with DuPont was that there indispensable to be an tangible full-blown health study finished of this village to find out what would celebration this chemical at the levels that these people are actually drinking—what would that do? What kind of diseases could that actually outcome in? And we motionless we would collect totally eccentric scientists. These had to be people that both sides concluded were unbiased, one way or the other. And trust it or not, we were means to actually name 3 epidemiologists that both sides concluded could demeanour at all of the data—what was published, what was unpublished—and decide: Is there a couple between celebration this, in the water, and these diseases?
And it took about 7 years. Seventy thousand people in the village came brazen and participated in the study. And at the finish of the day, the scholarship panel—what Bucky and Joe were referring to—the scholarship row associated only 6 diseases—two cancers, ulcerative colitis, thyroid disease—to celebration the water. They did not couple the birth defects. So, as Bucky was indicating, given of the way the allotment was set up, only the associated illness claims could pierce brazen at that point.
AMY GOODMAN: So, as we hang up, Bucky, you wanted to have a baby. we saw that baby last night at the premiere. And what did it mean, the contrast you indispensable to do and the fear that you and your wife have lived with?
BUCKY BAILEY: Well, recalling my childhood and the struggles that we faced, it was a very formidable decision. After the scholarship row and holding partial in that, we did do some genetic testing, and we was given a augury that there was a 50 percent possibility that my son would have the same deformities. And over the march of—
AMY GOODMAN: How complicated is your poisonous bucket in your body? And were you surprised?
BUCKY BAILEY: It was intensely aloft levels than my mother’s, who had directly worked with the chemical. And that was frightening for me. And we knew the—
AMY GOODMAN: You redefined the term “Teflon man.”
BUCKY BAILEY: Yeah, yeah.
AMY GOODMAN: Unfortunately, it did hang for you.
BUCKY BAILEY: Yeah.
AMY GOODMAN: But your suggestion is just indomitable. we mean, in the film, the way you’ve lived your life, the opinion of your relatives towards you, with the series, unconstrained series, of operations you have grown up with.
BUCKY BAILEY: It was a challenge, but my relatives were my rock. And we am respected to share my story, and just being one voice and partnering with another voice, showing the energy of speaking out.
AMY GOODMAN: Joe Kiger, your thoughts, as we finish up this shred right now, on what you would tell people in other countries where these companies are working, in this country, the turn of toxicity that people are experiencing that comes from your town?
JOE KIGER: You know, we tell people—somebody asked me here a while back and said, “Joe, what do we do?” we said, “You’ve got the playbook. You just have to run the plays. You know, the water you’re celebration substantially needs to be filtered. Get it tested. Get it filtered. And then, once you get into this, get you a good attorney.” we mean, a man like Rob, we mean, he stands out. This male is—the persistence of this man, what he’s done, given I’ve been with him. We, you know, started 17 years ago. But get somebody that’s associating of what’s going on. They have to do that. And like we say, the playbook is there.
AMY GOODMAN: Well, we wish to appreciate you all for being with us. Bucky Bailey, appreciate you so much, and for your intrepid onslaught via your life and how you’ve dealt with it; Joe Kiger, plaintiff in the C8 lawsuit against DuPont; and Rob Bilott, who’s represented 70,000 adults in lawsuits against DuPont, successfully won remuneration for his clients, whose celebration water had been infested by poisonous chemicals used to make Teflon.
This is Democracy Now! When we come back, the former boss of Kiribati—stay with us—the Pacific Island republic and their fears about meridian change.[break]
AMY GOODMAN: “Grazing in the Grass” by Hugh Masekela, the good trumpeter, composer, anti-apartheid activist, famous as the father of South African jazz, has died at the age of 78.